An increasing concern in power systems is on how to elicit flexibilities in demands for better supply/demand balance. To this end, several differentiated energy services have been put forward, wherein demands are discriminated by their different flexibility levels. Motivated by the duration-differentiated energy services, we have proposed energy services differentiated by durations, arrival times, and deadlines. The purpose of this paper is to study the market implementation of such multiplearrival multiple-deadline differentiated energy services. To verify the economic feasibility, we establish that in a forward market, there exists an efficient competitive equilibrium which attains the maximum social welfare. In addition, we show that future information will influence current decisions on power delivery by studying a special kind of causal allocation policy. Finally, we propose two tractable integer programs, namely the optimal arbitrage and the minimum-cost allocation problems, which can be embedded in a two-level hierarchical real-time implementation of differentiated energy services.
Introduction
We usually rely on operating reserves to balance supplies and demands in power systems. Such a supply-side approach is effective when the majority of power resources remain traditional resources, e.g., fossil fuels. Nowadays, more and more renewable energy, mainly generated from wind and solar farms, are being integrated into current power systems. With clean and inexhaustible sources, the strength of renewable resources is evident. Nevertheless, their inherent features, such as uncertainty and intermittency, have brought difficulties in the supply/demand balance. As a consequence, a large number of reserves have to be built to compensate for the volatility of the supply, at the expense of economic and environmental benefits [1] . For that reason, the supplyside approach is losing its effectiveness [2] .
On the other hand, increasing attention has been paid to leveraging flexibilities in demands to match supplies, often referred to as the demand response [3] . For example, without compromising on their levels of functionality, the charging processes of electric vehicles and residential pool pumps [4, 5] , can be modulated, suspended, and/or resumed appropriately to aid in the supply/demand balance. Substantial relevant results have been recorded in the literature [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Particularly, the GRIP (grids with intelligent periphery) is proposed in [12] , which conceptually presents a platform so as to implement a variety of applications regarding demand response.
Apart from the technical matters, we are concerned about economic issues, e.g., what are electricity products capable of eliciting load flexibilities? The traditional approach mostly treats electricity energy as homogeneous products sold at a unit price, while in demand response, we can classify electricity services into distinct energy products according to their different levels of flexibility. Based on this, several electricity markets have been theoretically established and analyzed to verify the practicability of demand response from the viewpoints of economics. See, for instance, [13] [14] [15] [16] and [17] .
Among kinds of demand-response services, of particular interest to us are differentiated energy services, which were firstly proposed and analyzed in [15] and [18] . The services studied in the two papers are called durationdifferentiated energy services, since they are classified by durations, which correspond to the quantities of available energy with a fixed power delivery rate.
In the aforementioned pioneering work, the energy can be delivered over the operational period. If we assign a deadline to each service and require the power delivery to be completed before the deadline, then such services are called duration-deadline jointly differentiated energy services. As the name indicates, the electricity services herein are distinguished by both the duration and deadline. Related analyses can be found in [14] and [19] .
Along this research line, in our previous papers [10, 20] , we propose a more practical setup by allowing involved services to have different arrival times. In this case, the available energy of each service can only be delivered from its arrival time to its deadline. Then, the flexibility levels of services are determined by the duration, arrival time, and deadline. We refer to such services as MultipleArrival Multiple-Deadline (MAMD) differentiated energy services. The resulting supply/demand matching problem has been studied in the mentioned papers. In this paper, we continue to inquire into the market implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services.
Firstly, we analyze a forward market implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services by considering two critical economic issues. One is the social welfare maximization problem, where all the market participants are altruistic and cooperative, while the other is the competitive equilibrium, where each member participates rationally in its own interests. We demonstrate that the optimum of social welfare can be attained in a competitive way. In other words, the mechanism of this market is in itself capable of leading self-interested consumers to the optimum social welfare even without the aid of a social planner. This verifies the economic feasibility of MAMD differentiated energy services.
Then, we check whether future information will influence the optimality of current decision-making on power allocation, for the sake of real-time applications of MAMD differentiated energy services. This is done by exploring the existence of a special type of causal allocation policy, which constructs a desirable power delivery without knowing the amounts of energy available in the future.
Finally, we put forward a two-level hierarchical scenario for the real-time implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services. Each level is associated with a special integer optimization problem. They are the optimal arbitrage problem concentrating on ameliorating the supply in a proper way, and the minimum-cost allocation problem aiming at minimizing distribution costs. Both problems are motivated by real applications but tractable from a computational perspective.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Preliminary knowledge is presented in Section 2. We give a detailed account for MAMD differentiated energy services in Section 3, where the supply/demand matching problem is revisited. We deal with the forward market implementation in Section 4, where the social welfare optimization problem is examined in Section 4.1, while the competitive equilibrium is studied in Section 4.2. In Section 5, we discuss the special allocation policies in the absence of future information. The real-time implementation scenario is introduced in Section 6. Finally, we end this paper with conclusions and future work. Preliminary results on the special case of duration-deadline jointly differentiated energy services were presented in [14] .
Notation
The set of real numbers (resp. nonnegative integers) is denoted by R (resp. N). Other sets are represented by calligraphic capital letters. We use italic capital letters to denote tensors including matrices except that T and N are reserved as special integers as indicated later. Particularly, matrices with all the elements being zeros or ones are respectively specified by O or E, whose sizes are inferred from the context. For a matrix A, its trace is denoted by tr(A). Moreover, we use A(n, :) and A(:, t) to denote the nth row and tth column of A, respectively. For a vector x ∈ R n , we define
For an assertion A, the indicator function 1(A) is one (resp. zero) if A is true (resp. false). Define [a] + = max{a, 0} for a real number a.
Preliminary
Several basic concepts on the majorization order will be introduced, and more details can be found in [21] . For a real vector
, for all s = 1, 2, . . . , N ; and x ≺ w y, saying x is weakly submajorized by y, if
y i , then write x ≺ y and say that x is majorized by y.
If we only consider N -dimensional real vectors in their nonincreasing rearrangements, the majorization order can be regarded as a partial order. If x ∈ N n , we define the partition conjugate of x, denoted by x * , as a vector in such a way that the jth element of x * is the number of elements in x which are no less than j. Mathematically,
* is nonincreasing and x * j = 0 if j > max i {x i }. The length of x * can be inferred from the context and should be no less than max i {x i }. Table 1 A summary of symbols.
MAMD Differentiated Energy Services

Symbol Description
T Total number of time slots; T ∈ N.
t Time slot index; t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }.
λ+1 number of special time instances; λ ∈ N.
Ti Arrival times or deadlines; i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
N Total number of loads involved; N ∈ N.
n Load index; n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }.
ht
Available energy in time slot t; ht ∈ N.
rn Duration requirement of load n; rn ∈ N.
Ta n Arrival time of load n; an ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
T dn Deadline of load n; dn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , λ}.
(rn, Ta n , T dn ) The service required by load n.
A(h, r, F ) Feasible power allocation matrices.
W (h, r, F ) Structure tensor.
In this section, we firstly revisit the setup of MAMD differentiated energy services introduced in [10] . Then, we review the supply/demand matching problemunder what conditions can the supply fulfill the demand requirements? For clarity, we summarize the symbols introduced in this section in Table 1 .
Supply/Demand Model Formulation
We evenly divide the operational horizon into T sequential time slots, indexed by t. At each time slot, the power generated from renewable resources can be delivered to a load at a certain rate, which is an integer multiple of the base rate. The power delivery during a single time slot can not be suspended. As indicated in [20] , it is enough to consider a simpler case where all the loads can only be charged at the base rate, which is assumed to be one unit per time slot and other related quantities are scaled accordingly. Overall, both the time and the electrical energy are quantized.
Let h t ∈ N denote the available units of electrical energy at time slot t. Hence, the supply can be concisely delineated by the supply profile:
The service provider points out a sequence of special time instances:
Considering a collection of deterministic loads, indexed by n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, we assume that each load claims a piece of MAMD differentiated energy service. The duration requirement of load n is denoted by r n , which specifies how many units of energy are required by this load. The service time of load n is denoted by (T an , T dn ), where T an is the arrival time while T dn is the deadline of this load. To be precise, the power delivery from the supply to load n can be allowed to occur only in time slots indexed by T an + 1, T an + 2, . . . , T dn . As a whole, the MAMD differentiated energy service of load n, denoted by (r n , T an , T dn ), is characterized by the duration requirement r n and the service time (T an , T dn ).
A charging profile is given by a (0, 1)-vector of length T whose positions of ones signify the time slots scheduled for the power delivery via a certain service. The charging profile is said to be feasible for load n or the service (r n , T an , T dn ), if the sum of its elements is equal to the duration requirement r n and all of its elements indexed by integers outside the closed interval [T a+1 , T d ] are zeros. As long as the requirements of duration and service time are satisfied, load n is indifferent to the actual power delivery time. That reflects the flexibility of involved loads. To be concise, all the duration requirements constitute the demand profile:
The pattern matrix F associated with the N loads refers to an N × T (0, 1)-matrix whose ones at the nth row appear at the positions indexed by T a + 1, T a + 2, . . . , T d exactly, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . In short, we use (r, F ) to represent all the requirements of the collection of loads.
Supply/Demand Matching Revisited
Given a supply profile h and a collection of loads with requirements specified by (r, F ), we say that the supply h is adequate for the demand (r, F ), if there exists a feasible power allocation such that the available supply h can satisfy the load requirements (r, F ). Mathematically, a feasible allocation is described by an N × T matrix A, called the feasible power allocation matrix, which satisfies
Denote the class of all the feasible power allocation matrices by A(h, r, F ). From a mathematical perspective, the supply/demand matching problem is to examine the nonemptiness of the matrix class A(h, r, F ) and find one of its elements if A(h, r, F ) is nonempty.
Throughout this paper, the monotonicity assumption below holds for notational convenience:
If λ = 1, then F = E and the nonemptiness of A(h, r, E) was characterized by D. Gale and H. J. Ryser [22, 23] .
Theorem 3 (Gale-Ryser) The matrix class A(h, r, E) is nonempty if and only if h ≺ w r * or r ≺ w h * .
According to our assumption, we can rewrite the majorization inequalities in the Gale-Ryser theorem as
The results in [10] and [20] generalize the left part above for λ ≥ 1 by defining a λth-order structure tensor as
where
is nonnegative. The following theorem, firstly recorded in [10] , specifies the condition under which the supply can satisfy the demand in the form of the nonnegativity of the tensor defined previously. An extension of the theorem will be addressed and applied in later sections. Theorem 4 A supply profile h is adequate for the demand (r, F ) if and only if W (h, r, F ) ≥ 0.
There are three loads in total. The associated pattern matrix F is shown on the left of Figure 1 . Hence, for any supply/demand profiles, the associated structure tensor has the size 2 × 3, where k 1 = 0, 1 and k 2 = 0, 1, 2. Let
The values of the two tensors W (ĥ, r, F ) and W (h, r, F ) are recorded on the right of Figure 1 in the order they are mentioned, wherein W 11 (ĥ, r, F ) is calculated bŷ
Thus, we have W (ĥ, r, F ) 0 and W (h, r, F ) ≥ 0. By Theorem 4, we conclude that the matrix class A(ĥ, r, F ) is empty while A(h, r, F ) is nonempty. This is consistent with what we observed.
Theorem 4 gives rise to an intriguing physical interpretation of the supply/demand matching. It means that the adequacy of the supply h for the demand (r, F ) can be derived from the fact that the demand tails are dominated by the corresponding supply tails for all the critical points. Let us explain more with the simplest case where λ = 1. In this case, the nonnegativity of the tensor is equivalent to the formula (5). Moreover, for k = 0, 1, . . . , T , the minuend of (5) is the summation of the least T − k elements of the supply profile and thus is named as the (k + 1)th supply tail. In contrast, the subtrahend is called the (k + 1)th demand tail because it is the aggregation of remaining duration requirements of all loads, assuming that the number of units of each load n receiving from the first k time slots is at least the minimum of k and r n . The (k + 1)th inequality means that the (k + 1)th demand tail should not exceed the (k + 1)th supply tail. For cases where λ > 1, similar interpretations can be obtained. Rather than a scalar k, every supply/demand tail pair is indexed by a vector of length λ, i.e., [
In the same way, the nonnegativity of the element indexed by [
in the tensor W (h, r, F ) corresponds to the dominance relationship between the associated supply/demand tail pair [20] .
A Forward Market Implementation
Apart from the supply/demand matching, another basic issue regarding MAMD differentiated energy services arises -from the perspective of economics, are such electricity services practicable? Referring to the procedures in [14] and [15] , we hereinafter explore the MAMD differentiated energy services in a forward market, where all the contracts have been signed before future delivery.
In particular, we consider a continuum of consumers and no single load is strong enough to have a marked effect on the market. Under these assumptions, every participant will act as a price taker and the problem setup is a little different from that built in Section 3. We begin with a detailed description of this forward market. The main three elements involved are given as follows:
1) Supply: Assume the supplies are all from free renewable resources. In advance of transactions, the energy provider knows the supply pro-
acterized by the duration requirement r and the service time specified by the arrival time T a and the deadline T d . For the same reason as mentioned before, assume that every service just provides the base power delivery rate, i.e., one unit per time slot. 3) Consumers: A continuum of loads are indexed by the unit interval, namely,
, where l(x) ∈ R + is interpreted as a per capita demand. The utility for consumer x employing l(x) pieces of the service r(x), T a(x) , T d(x) is given by
The utility function U is bounded and nonnegativevalued, where U x, r(x), T a(x) , T d(x) , 0 = 0. We denote the continuum of loads by
With a slight modification, we can obtain the following structure tensor W c (h, R c ) for the continuum of loads:
Following directly from Theorem 4 concerned with a finite number of discrete loads, the proposition below addresses the adequacy of an supply by virtue of an associated structure tensor in the continuum case, as defined above.
Proposition 6
The supply profile h is adequate for a continuum of consumers R c if and
In the sequel of this section, two economic issues will be discussed. One involves centralized optimization, focusing on the social welfare maximization, while the other concerns distributive optimization, coping with the competitive equilibrium.
Social Welfare Maximization
Assuming there is a social planner, we wonder what the overall benefit is in this market. The social welfare is measured by the summation of consumer welfare and supplier revenue. The consumer welfare is defined as the difference between consumers' total utilities and their expenditure for purchasing MAMD differentiated energy services, while the supplier revenue is defined as the difference between the gross profit from selling the MAMD differentiated energy services and the capitalized generation cost. Since all the supplies come from renewable resources, the generation cost is negligible. Hence, the social welfare function is reduced to the overall utilities of the continuum of consumers. Mathematically, the social welfare maximization problem is formulated as
The constraints, except for W c (h, R c ) ≥ 0, are called rationality constraints, because they are automatically satisfied for rational economic behaviors.
Proposition 7
The social welfare maximization problem (6) has an optimal solution for any type of measurable
For all loads indexed by x ∈ [0, 1], we define the set of differential terms subject to the rational constraints by
Thus, we obtain a set-valued correspondence: x → Ω(x). For simplicity, we write it in a compact form:
According to the integration of set-valued functions defined in [24] , we denote the integral of the set-valued correspondence as follows:
Combining (7) with (8), we rewrite the expression as:
By the first four theorems with respect to the integration of a set-valued function described in [24] , we conclude that G is convex and closed.
Then, we can redescribe the social welfare optimization problem by the notation regarding Z(x) and G and see whether the feasible region is compact:
Constraint (9b) consists of linear inequalities only. In light of this and the analysis of G, the optimization variable Z(1) is restricted to a compact and convex set by constraints (9a) and (9b). It follows that the optimal solution Z * (1) to the social welfare problem exists, regardless of the type of utility function.
In conclusion, the social maximization problem reveals the ceiling overall benefit that can be attained by all the market participants. It allocates the resources optimally in a central manner. However, in a real market, not every market participant will be completely disinterested.
Competitive Equilibrium
The following analysis is established in a perfectly competitive market, wherein every participant (i.e., the M = r, Ta, Td, π Ta,Td r n Ta,Td r Ta, Td ∈ {T0, T1, . . . , Tλ} , Ta ≤ Td, r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Td − Ta} supplier and consumers) behaves as a rational and selfish price-taker. Although the dynamics of such a market are outside the scope of this paper, we sketch the information flow in Figure 2 . The price of a piece of the service specified by (r,
and a quantity level, denoted by l(x). Correspondingly, the supplier calculates the number n Ta,T d r of each service (r, T a , T d ). After the long-run evolution of this competitive market, the price of each service converges to an equilibrium price, which should bring no incentives for rational participants to adjust their strategies. The discussions on equilibrium theory can be traced back to the pioneering work of Léon Walras [25] . We herein start with a detailed description of a competitive equilibrium.
For a market with the MAMD differentiated energy services described in this work, a competitive equilibrium is defined as a state satisfying the three conditions below: 1) Consumers maximize their own welfare. Consumer x selects l(x) pieces of the service r(x), T a(x) , T d(x) in order to maximize its net benefit. This amounts to solving the optimization problem below:
.
2) The supplier maximizes its revenue. Note that the production capacity is limited. To ensure the supply/demand balance, the adequacy constraint has to be considered. Firstly, define two symbols:
, and
Then, we obtain the following supplier revenue maximization problem. The constraints below follow naturally from the nonnegativity of the associated structure tensor and the definition of δ
3) The market is clear, i.e., the supply and demand balance out.
Note that the analysis with respect to the competitive equilibrium relies heavily on the assumption that an individual transaction has no influence on prices. As suggested in the seminal paper [26] , in a competitive economic model, the first thought coming to mind is to investigate whether an equilibrium exists or not when decisions are made in such a distributed manner as described above. If it indeed exists, a natural question then arises -what is the gap between the social welfare in a competitive equilibrium and the maximum social welfare attained by a social planner? By convention, a competitive equilibrium serves as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. If the aforementioned gap is zero, then the competitive equilibrium is said to be efficient. Otherwise, it is inefficient. The following theorem signifies the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 8 There exists an efficient competitive equilibrium in a forward market with MAMD differentiated energy services.
PROOF. In view of Proposition 7, we prove this theorem by finding a menu of service prices, which can make a competitive equilibrium attainable, by the method of Lagrangian duality.
Let Z * (1) and x → r * (x), T a * (x) , T d * (x) , l * (x) denote the optimal solution to the social welfare maximization problem (9) and the corresponding optimal social allocation, respectively. Dualize the social welfare problem regarding the constraints described by (9b). As a result, there exist a bundle of Lagrange multipliers
is also the optimal solution to the following optimization problem:
. (10) In the meantime, the complementary slackness should also be satisfied, which implies that
for
Then, we rewrite the term being maximized in (10) in accordance with (7) to obtain
wherein,
In the following, we explain why we use the notation for service prices above. To start with, we consider the consumer benefit maximization. We go back to the term (12) and treat it as the summation of an infinite number of sub-terms indexed by x ∈ [0, 1], and all these sub-terms are independent of each other. From this point of view, since Z * (1) solves (10), it is not difficult to see that
Hence, we conclude that no consumer will intend to violate the optimal allocation r * (x), T a * (x) , T d * (x) , l * (x) under the prices given by (13) .
To verify the equilibrium prices, it remains to show that under such prices, not only does the production described by n Ta,T d r maximize the supplier revenue, but also it can balance out the requirements of consumers in the market. Firstly, the supplier revenue can be restated
. Substituting the expression of the price (13) into the above formula yields
The inequality above follows directly from the adequacy constraint which is described by the nonnegativity of an associated structure tensor, while the last equality follows from the formula (11), as implied by the complementary slackness. Thus, it is clear that the maximum supplier revenue can be achieved when the production bundle is given by
In the meantime, we observe that the production bundle can make the market clear. Hence, we have shown that the optimal solution to the social welfare maximization problem (9) can help generate a menu of equilibrium prices, which can result in a state satisfying the three conditions for a competitive equilibrium. This completes the proof.
In the proof of Theorem 8, the Lagrange multiplier method is applied, which is well known to have a heuristic economic interpretation [27] . In view of the price expression (13) , for 0 ≤ r ≤ Td − Tâ.
The intuition behind lies in that the less laxity the service has, the higher the price of the service will be.
Theorem 8 signifies that the optimum social welfare can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium, irrespective of the presence of a social planner. This allows us to skirt the debate on the planner economy and the market economy to a certain degree. As shown in [14] , [15] and this paper, it is an accepted practice to check whether a new market is well-defined theoretically by exploring an efficient competitive equilibrium. In an efficient market, each participant makes decisions for its own benefit, but the market dynamics can converge to a socially optimal status automatically. Although these results rest on a perfectly competitive price system in a forward market, they indeed reveal the potential for the success of MAMD differentiated energy services in a practical market implementation.
Allocation without Future Information
In the previous section, we assume the energy provider knows the supply profile. However, in practice, it is hard for us to predict renewable electricity generations. With a view to real-time applications of MAMD differentiated energy services, we are wondering whether we can design an efficient power allocation policy such that it can always generate an appropriate power allocation without unnecessary waste or unexpected shortages in the absence of future information.
Definition 9 An allocation policy is said to be optimal in terms of feasibility if it exports a feasible allocation whenever we are given a supply/demand pair such that the supply is adequate for the demand.
An allocation policy is said to be causal if it is a power delivery strategy without knowing future information.
Recall that we use an N × T (0, 1)-matrix A to represent a power allocation. We call A(:, t) the allocation vector of time slot t; moreover, the allocation vectors of the first t time slots are summarized as A(:, 1 : t). At the beginning of each time slot t, the causal scheduler gets to know the available energy h t and publish A(:, t), as depicted by the flow graph in Figure 3 . Generally speaking, if there exists a causal allocation policy which is optimal in terms of feasibility, then it will bring convenience for the system operator to construct a feasible allocation for an adequate supply/demand pair in real time, since it suffices to estimate the available energy of the next time slot accurately.
We observe that such an optimal causal allocation policy indeed exists when the pattern matrix presents several special patterns. For example, restricted to durationdifferentiated energy services, we can apply a greedy allocation policy to attain a feasible allocation matrix causally whenever the supply is adequate. This policy assigns the energy units available in the current time slot to loads with longer remaining duration requirements and is therefore named as the Longest Duration First (LDF) algorithm [15] . In a similar manner, if all the loads share the same deadline but may have different arrival times, the LDF algorithm still works by comparing the remaining duration requirements of arrived loads. For more such special patterns, one can refer to [28] .
In the following, for the sake of contrast, let us see why the LDF algorithm can help us find feasible allocation vectors A(:, t) in chronological order in the durationdifferentiated energy services from a different viewpoint to that in [15] . For this purpose, it is enough to illustrate the mechanism on constructing A(:, 1) under the LDF algorithm. We use h(2 : t) to denote the supply available from time slot 2 to time slot T . Firstly, feasible allocation vectors for the first time slot constitute the following set:
{a | a ∈ {0, 1} N , a ≤ r, and a 1 ≤ h 1 }.
Then, we expect to find an element a in the above set such that the remaining demand r − a can be satisfied by as many kinds of future supply profile h(2 : T ) as possible. Finally, recall that the adequacy condition in this case reduces to a majorization inequality h ≺ w r * . The lemma below follows directly from Section 2.
Lemma 10 Ifr ≺ wr , then
It follows from Lemma 10 that the smaller the remaining demand r − a is in the weak submajorization order, it can be satisfied by more kinds of future supply. We can show by simple calculation that, given A(:, 1) generated by the LDF algorithm, r−A(:, 1) is weakly submajorized by r − a, where a is a feasible allocation vector for the first time slot. Hence, we can conclude that, if h(2 : T ) is adequate for the remaining demand r − a, then it is also adequate for r − A(:, 1), since
At this point, we have shown that there exists a causal allocation which is optimal in terms of feasibility by considering duration-differentiated energy services exclusively. However, things get much more complicated when we allow different arrival times and deadlines.
Proposition 11 There exists no causal allocation policy that is optimal in terms of feasibility for MAMD differentiated energy services.
PROOF. We prove it by examples. We use star symbols to denote fixed zeros, indicating the unavailable service time slots for each load. Two loads are involved. Their duration requirement are respectively given by r 1 = 4 and r 2 = 2, and their service times are specified by a 2×6 pattern matrix F : 
, F (:, 2 : 6) , and
However, none of the three sets is the superset of the other two. Hence, we cannot say which allocation vector for the first time slot is better in the absence of future supply information.
In view of Proposition 11, we see that in a real-time application of MAMD differentiated energy services, the power delivery scheduler has to make tradeoffs between the causality and the optimality in terms of feasibility. In order to better achieve a feasible allocation matrix, more effort should be made toward more accurate supply estimation. The proof of the above proposition also signifies that there exists no causal allocation policy that is optimal in terms of feasibility for the duration-deadline jointly differentiated energy services. In contrast to the corresponding result regarding the duration-differentiated energy services, Proposition 11 suggests the operation inconvenience resulted by allowing different deadlines and/or arrival times. We reserve it as an inspiring future research direction on how to make a better balance between more kinds of service time and easier operation.
Two-Level Hierarchical Scenario
In this section, we introduce a two-level scenario for the real-time implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services. As in a forward market implementation, the supply is assumed to be generated from renewable resources and thus it is unlikely to obtain accurate estimation of the available energy units in the distance future. In this situation, we suppose that the service provider firstly makes day-ahead contracts with customers based on a statistically optimal estimation of the supply profile. Then, in the real-time implementation, at the beginning of each time slot, the provider will trade with the outer electricity market appropriately to make up for the inaccurate estimation. This is the first level of the real-time implementation, while at the second level, the service provider calculates an optimal allocation for the energy available in the next time slot in light of the updated supply profile from the upper level and a certain optimality criterion.
This two-level scenario, depicted in Figure 4 , is conducted in a model-predictive manner, where we just update the supply and allocation of the current time slot with future time slots considered. Out of practical concerns, we assign each level a proper optimization problem to reach the required goals under acceptable computational cost. To be specific, the first level is associated with the optimal arbitrage problem we are about to describe, while the second level is related to the minimum-cost allocation problem introduced later.
Level 1: Optimal Arbitrage Problem
In the case that the real-time supply from renewable resources is not adequate, supplementary purchase of supply has to be made to compensate for the insufficiency of renewable electricity generation. Conversely, the redundant supply can also be sold to other grids. Moreover, there may be potential arbitrage opportunities so as to earn profits without sacrificing the adequacy of the supply profile for contracted differentiated energy services. In summary, the service provider may tactfully buy or sell units from the outer market to ameliorate the real-time supply profile, and even obtain arbitrage interests. This leads us to the optimal arbitrage problem.
Define an auxiliary integer vector p ∈ N T , called the purchase profile:
Assume that the unit buying/selling price varies over time slot and is denoted by b t /s t , for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Thus, we can define a sequence of time-indexed functions of expense: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
Rationally, the unit price for buying is a bit higher than that for selling, i.e., b t > −s t . Otherwise, the service provider will sell out the existing energy units and then buy units back from the outer market to maintain the supply/demand balance.
Specifically, the optimal arbitrage problem aims at designing a proper purchase profile such that the resulting combined supply profile (h + p) is adequate for the demand (r, F ) and the total expenditure is as small as possible. For simplicity, we assume that the transaction fee is free. Mathematically, the optimal arbitrage problem is formulated as
subject to (1); (2); (4); A(:, t) 1 ≤ h t + p t , for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
In spite of the above integer-programming formulation, we show in Appendix B that the optimal arbitrage problem can be solved in polynomial time. Moreover, in a very special case when the buying prices are strictly positive and time-invariant, while the selling prices remain zero, the optimal arbitrage problem actually reduces to investigating the minimum amount of additional purchase to make an insufficient supply adequate for the demand (adequacy gap). Such an adequacy gap problem has been deeply studied in our previous papers [10, 20] , where we provide much simpler problemspecific algorithms other than the off-the-shelf solvers suggested in Appendix B. For reference, we reproduce the adequacy gap problem below.
To summarize, the optimal arbitrage problem can help ameliorate the real-time supply profile in a twofold sense: Firstly, the resulting supply profile should be adequate for the remaining demand, which can aid us in tackling the volatility of renewable generation from a trading viewpoint. Secondly, gain benefits from price difference over time slot. Such benefits may help attract more electricity consumers and we reserve it as future work on how to make use of them to construct a better market with differentiated energy services. Despite the simplicity, the solutions to optimal arbitrage problems with meaningful price parameters should shed light on more complicated matters in actual operations.
Level 2: Minimum-Cost Allocation Problem
At the second level of this scenario, optimal allocation problems are taken into account. We herein introduce one which can be associated with well-studied classic resource allocation problems. Use A ∈ {0, 1} N ×T to denote a feasible power allocation when the supply is adequate. We can relate a distribution cost weight C(n, t) to each position in A(n, t) (a potential power delivery) for the following reasons. Firstly, the available energy is delivered to different loads via different distribution lines. Secondly, the running status of power systems varies over time, which will affect the cost of transporting one unit from the supply to a certain demand. These weights, constituting a weight matrix C ∈ R N ×T , are determined by infrastructure facilities, local power network status, and relevant power markets, etc. These lead us to the minimum-cost allocation problem, whose target is to find a feasible power allocation such that the total distribution cost (viz. the summation of C(n, t)A(n, t) over both the load and time indices) is minimum when the supply is adequate. Following is the mathematical expression of the optimization problem:
C(n, t)A(n, t) = tr(CA) (Minimum-cost allocation) subject to (1); (2); (3); (4).
At first sight, the above problem is an integer linear program and would be intractable. However, we can show its polynomial solvability by casting the minimum-cost allocation problem into a minimum-cost flow problem.
To this end, we give the corresponding network-flow formulation of the minimum-cost allocation problem. An illustrative example is presented in Figure 5 . Initially, a single source node and a single sink node are given in the flow network. We associate time slot t with a particular node and construct an arc from the source node to the node with capacity h t , for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Similarly, we associate load n with a particular node and construct an arc from the node to the sink node with capacity r n , for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . In addition, for each one in the pattern matrix F , we construct an arc from the corresponding time-slot node to the corresponding load node with capacity one. To this point, we complete the construction of the associated flow network. Clearly, every feasible power allocation matrix corresponds to a feasible flow in the constructed flow network. The flow on any arc connected to the source or sink node has zero cost, while the flow on the arc connecting the tth time-slot node to the nth load node has the perunit cost C(n, t). The minimum-cost flow problem is to find a feasible flow of value r 1 with the minimum cost. Ordinarily, the minimum-cost flow problem deals with real numbers. Nevertheless, we see the equivalence between the minimum-cost allocation problem and the minimum-cost flow problem in the constructed flow network with the help of the following lemma [29] .
Lemma 12 (Primal Integrality) If each edge has an integer capacity, then there exists an integer flow which is an optimal solution to the minimum-cost flow problem.
The minimum-cost flow problem is known as a classic decision problem and several network-flow algorithms can be applied to finding an optimal integer flow when each edge has an integer capacity. A thorough survey of these algorithms can be found in [29] . Thus, we have verified that the minimum-cost allocation problem can be solved in polynomial time with the help of the network-flow reformulation and existing network-flow algorithms, like the network simplex algorithm [30] . By further exploring the statistical characteristics of the input data, one can select a statistically better networkflow solver to achieve the optimal solution.
As suggested by the optimal arbitrage and minimumcost problems, optimization problems regarding MAMD differentiated energy servcies are integer programs in their original forms and may be deemed intractable at first sight. However, because of their nice properties regarding objective functions and feasible regions, they can be properly transformed into problem formulations with standard solvers. A common case is that we can eliminate the gap between the original integer program and the relaxed non-integer program, e.g., the optimal arbitrage problem. A better case is that the original form can be transformed into a network formulation, which is generally equipped with more efficient specialized algorithms, e.g., the minimum-cost allocation problem. Although not every optimization problem regarding MAMD differentiated energy services can be efficiently solvable, the two problems discussed in this section can cover a number of real applications and thus applicable in practical implementations. In particular, by embedding the two problems in the two-level hierarchical implementation introduced in the beginning, we can reach the goals for each level to a certain degree.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we investigate the market implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services. Firstly, by examining a forward market implementation, we demonstrate the economic feasibility of MAMD differentiated energy services by proving the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium. We show that the distributive solution in the competitive price system is consistent with the centralized one attained by a social planner. Informally speaking, the market mechanism itself can allocate resources efficiently. Secondly, as a step toward real-time applications of MAMD differentiated energy services, we study allocation policies without future supply information. Since there exists no allocation policy which is both causal and optimal in terms of feasibility, we take notice of the influence of future information on current decisions. Finally, we introduce a twolevel hierarchical real-time implementation of MAMD differentiated energy services. Specifically, we propose the optimal arbitrage problem to ameliorate the supply profile at the first level, and the minimum-cost allocation problem to minimize the distribution cost at the second level. We show that both problems are raised out of practical concerns and can be solved in polynomial time, irrespective of their integer-programming formulations.
In the future, we will put more emphasis on the practical applications of differentiated energy services. Firstly, we will conduct a real-time application of differentiated energy services driven by field data. Secondly, considering economic analysis, we should not ignore the market design, which requires more attention on the market dynamics. Moreover, as mentioned before, the estimation of supply may not be accurate. Many technical issues remain to be discussed regarding how to apply differentiated energy services more efficiently in the presence of such uncertainties [31] .
A Totally Unimodular Matrices
Totally unimodular matrices play an important role in the study of tractable integer programs. Below are a few useful concepts from books [32] and [33] .
Definition 13 A matrix is called a totally unimodular matrix (TUM) if every square submatrix has determinant −1, 0, and 1.
A collection of equivalent characterizations for TUMs can be found in Theorem 19.3 of [33] . Given a matrix, we can check whether it is a TUM in polynomial time. Also, it is well known that many special matrices belong to TUMs, e.g., the incidence matrix of a directed graph, the incidence matrix of an undirected bipartite graph, and the coefficient matrix derived by the constraints of a maximum flow problem. The magic of TUMs lies in that they eliminate the integrality gap between an integer linear program and its relaxed linear program. To see this, look at the following lemma. Note that a polyhedron {x | Ax ≤ b} is said to be an integer polyhedron if it is the convex hull of all the integer vectors inside it.
Lemma 14 ([33])
If A is a TUM and b is an integer vector, then the polyhedron {x | Ax ≤ b} is an integer polyhedron.
B Tractability of Optimal Arbitrage Problem
In general, integer programming is NP-complete. However, it happens that a class of integer programs are tractable if both the objective function and the feasible region possess nice properties. Based on this, we analyze the tractability of the optimal arbitrage problem from the two aspects.
Firstly, we see that f t (p t ) is a convex function for p t ∈ R. Actually, the objective function of the optimal arbitrage problem is a separable convex function, which is defined as the summation of independent single-variable convex functions. As shown in [34] , a single-variable integer convex function can be closely approximated by a linear minimization program over an auxiliary optimization variable vector. In a similar manner, we can transform the separable convex objective function into a linear program over separate auxiliary optimization variable vectors. Without loss of generality, we stack all the auxiliary variable vectors into a bigger vector and call it γ. Therefore, the function value of T t=1 f t (p t ) is given by the optimum of an associated linear program over the newly introduced variable vector γ. As a result, by replacing the original separable convex objective functions with a linear program over γ in accordance with the procedures in [34] , we can attain an equivalent ILP over the three optimization variables: γ, A, p, for the considered optimal arbitrage problem.
Secondly, we will show that the feasible region of the optimal arbitrage problem also has a nice property. Recast the constraints of the optimal arbitrage problem in the matrix-vector form:
where vec(A) denotes the vector-form of A. It is easily seen that the coefficient matrixÃ is derived from a coefficient matrix of a particular maximum flow problem, by appending an appropriate number of rows or columns with only one nonzero element, which is ±1. As mentioned in Appendix A, the coefficient matrix of a maximum flow problem is totally unimodular while the unimodularity of a matrix will be preserved after appending a row whose single nonzero element is 1 or −1. Therefore, we can conclude thatÃ is a TUM as well. Moreover, we see thatb is an integer vector. Thus, by Lemma 14 in Appendix A, the following set is an integer polyhedron:
In other words, the extreme points of this polyhedron all consist of integer elements.
In view of these, we relax the equivalent ILP mentioned before into a LP. Due to the special property of the feasible region of the optimal arbitrage problem, we see that if (γ,Â,p) is an optimal solution to the relaxed LP, which is also an extreme point of the feasible region of the LP, then (γ,Â,p) is also an optimal solution to the resulting ILP. Furthermore, by trivial projection, we see that (Â,p) is also an optimal solution to the optimal arbitrage problem.
To summarize, the optimal arbitrage problem can be abstractly solved as follows. Firstly, we recast the optimal arbitrage problem into its equivalent ILP. Secondly, solve the corresponding relaxed LP by finding an optimal extreme point. Finally, extract an optimal solution to the optimal arbitrage problem from the aforementioned extreme point. Since the transformations in the first and third steps can be done in polynomial time and we just solve a LP in the second step, we can conclude the tractability of the optimal arbitrage problem.
